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ABSTRACT
This paper surveys recent developments in the theory of
pareto efficient taxation. This literatureattempts to
characterize those tax structures which, given the limitations on
the government's information and other limitationson the
government's ability to impose taxes, maximize the welfare of one
individual (group of individuals) subject to the government
obtaining a given revenue and subject to other (groups of)
individuals attaining certain specifiedlevels of utility.
Utilitarian (or other) social welfare functions can then be used
to select among these pareto efficient tax structures. While the
original goal of this line of research, which was to provide a
'scientific" basis for arguing for a progressive tax structure,
has not been achieved——and does not seem achievable——important
insights have been gleaned, which should enable governments to
make better choices of tax policies in the future. On the other
hand, this research has cast serious doubt on the relevance of
many long standing results, including those of Ramsey concerning
the structure of commodity taxes.
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2Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation
and the New New Welfare Economics'
Joseph E. Stiglitz
For more than a hundred years, economists have attempted to show that
progressive taxation can be justified on more fundamental principles. Among the
earliest of such attempts was that of Edgeworth [1868, 1897], who tried to show
that utilitarianism (combined with two other assumptions) implied progress-
ivity. His argument was simple: he postulated that all individuals had the
same utility of income function, and that they exhibited diminishing marginal
utility. Since social welfare was simply the sum of the utility functions of
all individuals, it immediately followed that the decrease in social welfare
from taking a dollar (or a pound) away from a rich person was less than the
1Paperprepared for the Handbook on Public Economics, A. Auerbach and
M. Feldstein, eds. The author is indebted to A. Auerbach for comments on a
previous draft.
Although this paper is primarily a survey of existing literature, several
sections are based on until now unpublished work, and several sections contain
new proofs of previously published results. New results are reported in
section 8, on optimal taxation where those who are more productive in more
"outside't employment are also more productive in activities at home; section
13.1, on the taxation of capital income in imperfect capital markets; section
14, on altruism and inheritance taxation and section 15, on commitment. New
proofs are contained in section 5, on random taxation; in section 3, on partial
pooling; in section 9, on Pareto efficient taxation with general equilibrium
effects; and in section 2, on characterizing the pareto efficient tax
structure.
All workers in this area owe an intellectual debt to James Nirrlees. I
should like to acknowledge this debt as well as my indebtedness to my several
collaborators who have greatly influenced the formulation of my ideas: Partha
Dasgupta, Richard Arnott, Raaj Sah, Bob Britto, Steve Slutsky, John Hamilton,
and especially A. B. Atkinson. I am also indebted to Alan Auerbach, Yungoll
Yun and B. Salanie who provided comments on an earlier draft.
Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
3decrease in social welfare from taking a dollar away from a poor person.
With the advent of the New Welfare Economics in the 1930's, interest in
optimal taxation waned: interpersonal utility comparisons of the kind employed
in utilitarianism were viewed to be inadmissible. Whether taxes should be
progressive might be an appropriate question for a moral philosopher, but not
for an economist. Economists, in their role as economists, should limit
themselves to identifying Pareto efficient allocations, and to finding Pareto
inefficiencies and showing how these could be eliminated.
Many policy economists found this a too circumscribed view of their role.
In almost all of the choices which they faced, some individuals were better
off, others worse off. If they could not make some interpersonal comparisons,
they would not be in a position to contribute much to policy debates.
This provided the setting for the re-examination of the design of tax
structures in the 1970's, at first making use of utilitarian social welfare
functions, but then broadening the analysis to investigate the consequences of
a wider class of social welfare functions. The major advance over Edgeworth's
earlier work (due to Mirrlees [1971]) was the recognition of the incentive
effects associated with taxation2; there was a trade-off between equity and
efficiency considerations, a trade-off which Edgeworth had ignored. Mirrlees'
calculations (though only an example) provided less support, however, for the
advocates of progress ivity than they had hoped. With what seemed reasonable
hypotheses concerning individual utility functions, the optimal tax schedule
looked close to linear.
Those brought up within the doctrines of the New Welfare felt distinctly
2The presence of trade-of fs between equity and efficiency
considerations had, of course, long been recognized, and there
had even been some formal modelling (See Fair [1971]).
4uneasy about these developments; the analysis seemed so dependent on the
implicit or explicit interpersonal utility comparisons.
This paper is concerned with what the New New Welfare Economics has to say
about the design of tax structures. The New New Welfare Economics is
distinguished by two features: First, unlike much of the "old" New Welfare
Economics and unlike the earlier Utilitarian analysis, it does not assume that
the government has at its disposal the information required to make lump sum
redistributions; it identifies who is able to pay higher taxes at least partly
by using endogenous variables, like income or consumption.3 It is this
limitation on the information of the government which results in taxation being
distortionary, and which gives rise to the trade-off between equity and ef-
ficiency.
Grantedthat the government has imperfect information, on the basis of
which itcan redistributeincome, what is the best that canbedone? The New
NewWelfare economics attempts to answer this question and to describe the
Pareto efficient tax structures, i.e. the tax structures which get the economy
to the utilities possibilities schedule, given the limitations on the
government's information and other limitations on the government's ability to
impose taxes.
Just as the earlier New Welfare Economics argued that it is essential
first to identify the set of Pareto efficient allocations, so that one could
separate out efficiency considerations from the value judgments associated with
choices among Pareto efficient points, so too does the New New Welfare
Economics. There are some properties that all Pareto efficient tax structures
have, whereas other properties may be specific to particular Pareto efficient
31t may, of course, also use exogenous variables, like age.
5tax structures, e.g. those which would be chosen with a utilitarian social
welfare function.Economists may make an important contribution by
identifying Pareto efficient tax structures, but it still remains the case that
many of the critical choices necessitate interpersonal trade-of fs, choices
among alternative Pareto-efficient allocations. The use of Social Welfare
Functions can provide a useful way of thinking systematically about these
trade-offs; one of the objectives of this paper is to show how this has been
done, and some of the dangers and pitfalls that arise in doing so.
The topics which are the subject of this chapter include some of the areas
in which there has been the most active research during the past fifteen
years. We cannot and do not provide a complete survey; what we attempt to do
is to put this literature in perspective, to provide some of the key parts of
the analysis, and to refer the reader to more detailed surveys or articles
dealing with particular topics.
The paper is divided into three parts. Part I discusses Pareto efficient
taxation in a one commodity world. The central question is, how progressive
should the tax structure be? Part II is concerned with the circumstances under
which it is desirable to impose commodity taxation (at different rates on
different commodities and to tax the return to capital.) We conclude in Part
III with some general observations concerning extensions and interpretations of
the general theory.
6Part I. One Commodity Neo-Classical Models
2.1 The Basic Model
The basic issues can be illustrated by a simple model of an economy in
which there are two types of individuals and a single produced commodity; we
shall assume that type 2 individuals are more productive than type 1
individuals, i.e. their output per unit of time spent working is larger.
Assume that all individuals have the same utility function
U(C1 ,L1),
where C is the consumption of an individual of type i (this may be a whole
vector of consumption goods, possibly dated), and L is his labor supply.4 An
individual of type i has a productivity (output per hour) of w. Thus, in the
absence of taxation, the individual's budget constraint would simply be
(1) C =Y=
whereY is the individual's income.
By imposing lump sum taxes (or subsidies), M, on individuals of type i (so the
individual's budget constraint is now
(1') C =Y—M =wL
—
sothat the revenues raised by taxes on one group are redistributed as lump sum
payments to the other group:
(2) M1N1+M2N2=O,
where N is the number of individuals of type 1,
we can trace out the whole utilities possibilities schedule. (See figure 1)
2.1 Optimal Lump Sum Taxes
4Throughout, we assume that utility functions are "well
behaved."
7The optimal redistributive taxdependson the social welfare function.
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where U is the utility of the ith type of individual.
The former is maximized at the point on the utilities possibilities schedule
where the slope is -1; the latter by the intersection of the utilities
possibilities schedule with a 450 line (See Figure 2).
Analytically, the utilitarian solution with lump sum taxation is
characterized by the equality of the marginal utility of consumption:5
(4) aU1/aC1=
whilethe marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure is equal to
the individualts marginal product (wage):
(5) w3U/aC + u1/aL=o
This,in turn, means that so lone as leisure is a normal good. the more able
individual is actually worse of f.6 This can be seen most easily in the case of
a separable utility function
5Assume output Q =F(N1L,N2L2) a function of the imputs of the two
types of labor. We form the Lagrangian.
£ =N1U1+N2U+p[F(N1L1, N2L2) -C1N1
-C2N2]
(4) and (5) follow from the first order conditions.
6This assumes, of course, that we can make interpersonal comparisons. The
utilitarian solution has the property that the high ability individuals would
prefer the {C,L} allocation of the low ability individual.
8(6) Ui =u(C1)
-v(L).
For then, (4) ensures that all individuals, regardless of their ability,
receive the same level of consumption; but then the efficiency condition (5)
implies that those with a higher productivity have a higher marginal disutility
of work, i.e. that they provide a greater labor supply (see figure 3). (This
seems in accord with the Marxian dictum, Hf each according to his abilities,
to each according to his needst'.) Notice that the more able individuals are
actually better off in the Rawlsian solution than they are under utilitar-
ianism.
2.2 Imperfect information. The previous analysis assumed that the government
had perfect information about who was of type 2, and who was of type 1.
Clearly, if the government couldn't tell, the more able individuals would
(under the utilitarian solution) have no incentive to come forward to claim
their greater ability; they would know that, if they were to do so, they would
actually be worse off. The government, in its choice of tax structures, must
recognize these limitations on its information. In our example with only two
groups, the government has a choice of two kinds of tax structures: (a) those
in which the government is unable to distinguish (ex post or ex ante)among
individuals; this is called a cooling eguilibrium7 (b) those in which the
more able and the less able can (ex post) be identified as a result of the
actions undertaken by the different groups; this is called a self-selection
7This vocabulary was first introduced, in the context of the
analysis of how competitive markets distinguish among individuals
with different characteristics, by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
9equilibrium.8 To attain a self-selection equilibrium, the two groups have to
be given choices, such that the first group prefers one choice, the second
group the other choice. (These are called the self-selection constraints.)9
We assume, however, that the individual's labor input is not observable,
just as his productivity is not observable; his before tax income,
Y wL
is, however, observable. (Obviously, if both before tax income is observable,
and labor input were observable, then one could immediately infer the
ind±vidualts productivity, w,; more generally, even if hours on the job is
observable, effort is not.° )Thus,it may be possible to differentiate among
individuals on the basis of their choices of the observable variables {C,YJ. We
seek to characterize the Pareto efficient pairs of (Ci, Y}. To do this, we
81t is also referred to as a separatin2 equilibrium, because
the observed actions of the individuals separate them according
to types; or as a revealin2 equilibrium, because their actions
reveal who they are.
9Since, in self-selection equilibria, individuals' types can
be identified, one could, alternatively, have asked the individu-
al what type he was, with the understanding that the consequences
for the individual are precisely those associated with the self- -
selectionequilibrium. Similarly, in the pooling equilibrium, if
the individual were told that nothing would depend on what
statement he made concerning his abilities, he would have no
incentive to lie. Thus, the set of possible equilibria cor-
respond to those which could be attained if individuals are
simply asked what their ability is, and are provided with
incentives not to lie. This (loosely speaking) is referred to as
the revelation principle. See R. Myerson (1983).
The self-selection constraints are sometimes referred to
as the incentive compatibility constraints.
10 In jobs where individuals punch time clocks, presumably
hours worked is observable. But note that were the government to
base its tax on the individual's wage rate, firms would have an
incentive to collude with the workers in "cheating't on the
official hours worked. Such practices are already common in
circumstances where bureacratic regulations impose a maximum on
compensation per hour.
10rewrite the ith individual's utility function in terms of the observable
variables (C ,Y }:
(7) V(C,Y) =U(C,Y/w).
It is useful to note three properties of this derived utility function.
First, increases in Y (income) decrease utility (keeping C, consumption,
fixed), because to attain the increases in income, more labor must be expended.
Second, the more productive individual has a flatter indifference curve. This
follows from observing that the marginal rate of substitution,
(aC/aY )= —E aviay]/[aV/ac]=—[ (3U/L)/w lIEau/aC]
If leisure is a normal good, then at any given set of values of {C,Y), labor
will be lower for the more productive individual, and hence the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and labor will be lower, i.e.
(ac/aL)—= —[aU/aL]/[au/aC]
is smaller. Higher ability individuals have flatter indifference curves (in
[C,Y}. (See Figure 4.)
Finally, we note that when individuals maximize their utility in the
absence of taxation, they set their marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor equal to the wage, i.e.
(aC/aL) =[au/LJ/[aui/aci]=WI,
fromwhich it immediately follows that in the absence of taxation
(aC/aY) =—[av/aY]/[av/ac1J
=-[(aU1/aL1)/w1/[aU/aC.]=1;
the slope of the indifference curve in {C,Y1 space is unity.
The first basic result on Dareto efficient tax structures is this: with
two groups, Pareto efficiency requires a self-selection equilibrium; the
11government will, in fact, wish to differentiate among individuals on the basis
of their observed incomes. (Stiglitz [manuscript]).11 This result is not gen-
eral: with many groups, although a complete pooling equilibrium is not
consistent with Pareto efficiency, a partial pooling equilibrium (one in which
several different types take the same action) may be.'2
The set of Pareto efficient self-selection equilibria is easy to
characterize: although the government in general sets a whole tax function
(which in turn determines the relationship between after tax and before tax
income), when there are only two groups, only two points on this schedule will
be chosen. We simply need to characterize those two points, or equivalently,
to characterize the {consumption, incomel decisions of the two groups (figure
5).
Formally, then, the set of Pareto efficient self-selection allocations is
described by the solution to
'Thisresult is easy to see. Assume there were a pooling
equilibrium, E, as depicted in figure 4. Any point lying between
the two indifference curves will, together with E, separate. For
instance, if the government were to offer H and E, the more able
would choose H and the less able E. Assume that the slope of the
more able indifference curve through E is less than 1. Then
there exist points (such as H) slightly above the more able
individual's indifference curve, which will be chosen only by the
more able, and which increase government revenue (since
consumption increases less than income.) The pair IH,E} pareto
dominates E. (If the slope of the more able indifference curve
through E is greater than 1, then there exists a point below E,
in the shaded area, which will separate and which will generate
more government revenue.)
12The essential assumption for this result is that the
indifference curve between consumption and pre-tax income is
unambiguously steeper for the less able.
12max V(C2,Y2) (8)
{C1 ,C2 ,Y1 ,Y2 I
s.t. V1(C1,Y1) ?:U2*, (9)
V2(C2,Y2) ￿ V2(C1,Yi)l (10)
Jtheself-selection
V1 (C1 ,Y1)V(C2,Y2) constraints (11)
R =(Y1-C1)N1+(Y2-C2)N2>R*the revenue (12)
constraint
(where R is government revenue, R* is the revenue requirement)13
The Lagrangian for this maximization problem may be written
£V2(C2,Y2)+MV1(C1,Y1)+X2(V2(C2,Y2)_V2(C1,Y1)) (13)
+ X1(Vl(C1,Y1)-Vl(C2,Y2))+Z[(Y1_C1)N1+(Y2_C2)N2_R*.
The first-order conditions for this problem are straightforward:
=
J.1 - A2I1.+A1 - TN1=0, (14a)
ac1
-=.3L X2 j1. + A1 .+TN1 =0, (14b)
aY1
13Notice that this problem is just the dual to the standard
problemof a monopolist attempting to differentiate among his
customers[Stiglitz (1977) and (forthcoming).]There, the
problemwas to maximize profits (corresponding to R here),
subject to utility constraints on each of the two types of
individuals (that he be willing to purchase the good, referred to
as the reservation utility or individual rationality constraint)
and subject to the self-selection constraints. The Lagrangian
which we form to analyze the two problems is identical.
Here the constraint on the individual's utility arises
because we wish to ensure him a certain level of utility; in the
standard monopoly problem, the constraint arises because the
transaction is voluntary, and if the monopolist does not offer
him the level of utility that he could have obtained without
trading with the monopolist, he will choose not to deal with him.
13af. =+ j.-X, IY! - N2=0, (l4c)
ac2 ac2 3c2 ac2
= — + '2 -3+ 2N2 =0, (14d)
aY2 aY2 ay2
It is easy to see that, under our assumptions concerning the relative
slopes of the indifference curves, there are three possible regimes:
(i) A, =0,'2= 0[fig 6(a)].
(ii) A, =0,A2 >0[fig.6(b)].
(iii)A2 0, A, >0[fig.6(c)].
That is, at most one of the two self-selection constraints is binding.
Moreover, it is also easy to show that J>O, i.e. the constraint on the utility
level of the low ability individuals is binding.
The case where A, =A20 is illustrated in fig. 6(a). With first-best
taxation, the equilibrium is fully revealing. This is always the case at the
competitive equilibrium. Hence, if the social welfare function chooses the
competitive allocation (C in figure 1) or a point near it, neither
self-selection constraint will be binding.'4
The ttnormaltt case, on which most of the literature has focused, is that
where A, =0and A2 >0.This arises whenever the government wishes to improve
the welfare of the poor significantly relative to what they would have obtained
at the competitive allocation (with uniform lump sum tax to raise the requisite
revenue). With a utilitarian objective function (.i= 1)(or indeed any concave
social welfare function) and separable utility functions it can be shown that
14The same result obviously holds if a uniform lump sum tax
is imposed. (See Figure 7)
14this is the only possibility.15But more generally, the possibility that X1>O
and A20 cannot be ruled out. The case with [X1>O and X2=O1 has the property
that if lump-sum taxation were feasible, the lump-sum tax imposed on the low
ability individual would exceed that on the high ability (Figure 6c).
2.3 Implementing the optimal allocations by means of a tax structure.
In the preceding subsection, we described the Pareto efficient resource
allocation.We posed the problem as if the government confronted the
individual with a choice of two "bundles". These allocations can easily be
implemented by means of a tax schedule, as illustrated in Figure 8. The tax
schedule must pass through the points (C,Y} ,1=1,2;and elsewhere must lie
below the indifference curves through (C,YJ. Given such a tax schedule,
individual I will clearly choose the point (CL,YL}.
If the tax schedule were differentiable,
T =T(Y)







The left hand side is the individualts marginal rate of substitution; the right
hand side is the after tax marginal return to working an extra hour.
15 The issue of which of the self-selection constraints is binding has
played a major role in the debate over the relevance of the theory of implicit
contracts with asymmetric information; with separable utility functions and
risk neutral firms, one obtains over-employment (all firms wish to pretend to
be in the good state.) See Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983); Stiglitz (1986);
and Hart (1983). The analysis is exactly parallel to that presented here.
15It is clear from figure 8 that the implementing tax schedules will not,
in general, be differentiable. Still we shall refer to
1 + aV'/aY1 =1+ 1au/aL. (16)
av/ac au/ac
as the marginal tax rate.6
2.4 The optimal tax structure with X2>O. X1 =0.
Dividing (14d) by (14c) we immediately see that
-aV2ia2 =- 8U2/aL2
..j.=1
aviac2 au/ac2 w2 (l7a)
the marginal tax rate faced by the more able individual is zero (although the
average tax rate is positive). [This corresponds to the result noted earlier by
Sadka (1976) and Phelps (1973)]. The argument for this can be easily seen
diagrammatically. Assume that the government offered a pair of separating
contracts, {E1,E2}, as in figure 9, but in which the slope of the more ablets
indifference curve (in terms of {C,Y1) at (E2} differed from unity. Then,
keeping {E1} fixed, and moving along the more able's indifference curve, one
obtains alternative pairs of separating contracts; if the slope at {E2} was
less than one, by increasing Y2, one increases 2's consumption by less than
income, and hence government revenue is increased; the original allocation
could not have been Pareto efficient; similarly if the slope at E2J is greater
than unity, one can increase government revenue by reducing Y2.
Dividing (14b) by (14a),
16There exist optimal tax structures for which
j... au/aL1+1
w au/ac
is the left-handed derivative of the tax function at Y =
16- av11ay1=.j.aU1/aL1 =_____ + <1 (17b)
v1/ac1 1au/ac1x2av/ac1 +





Then (17b) can be rewritten as
a1 =1+va2=a2+1-a2
1+v 1+v
Since, by assumption, a1>a2, it therefore follows that
a2 <a1 <1.
We immediately see that the mar2inal tax rate faced by the less able
individual will be positive.17
2.5 The optimal tax structure with A1 >0.A2 =0.
Exactly the same kinds of arguments as used in the previous section can be
employed to establish that if A1 >0and A2 =0,the mar2inal tax rate faced by
the more able individual is negative; self-selection requires that they work
more than they would in a non-distortionary situation. For the rest of this
paper, we focus our attention on the tnormaltl case with A1 =0and A2 >0.
Our analysis has thus revealed a second property of pareto efficient tax
structures: at least one of the groups must face no distortionary taxation.
This result holds regardless of the number of groups in the population.
'This corresponds to the result noted earlier by Mirrlees
for the case of a continuum of types.
17We can again characterize the utilities possibilities schedule, this time
under the constraint that lump sum taxes are not feasible. The new utilities
possibilities schedule coincides with the old over a range, but elsewhere is
interior. The range over which the two coincide corresponds to the situations
where X1 == 0.(See Figure 1)
2.6 Equity-efficiency trade-of fs. This analysis makes clear the nature of the
equity-efficiency trade-of fs that are inherent in redistributive tax policies.
There is a "distortion" associated with redistributing any significant amount
of resources from the more able to the less able. The distortion arises from
the self-selection constraint. The magnitude of the distortion depends in part
on the amount of revenue that the government is attempting to raise for public
goods. Note that one feasible policy, a uniform lump sum tax on all
individuals, is among the set of Pareto efficient tax structures. It is,
however, one which does not seem acceptable to most modern governments. (It is
sometimes assumed that lump sum taxes are not feasible. Uniform lump sum taxes
are clearly feasible (provided they are not too large). What j not feasible
are lump sum taxes at different rates for individuals of different abilities;
This is not feasible because the government does not have the requisite
information to implement such a tax.)
3. Continuum of individuals.
Though most of the central insights in the theory of Pareto efficient (and
optimal) taxation can be gleaned from the simple model presented above, the
earliest analyses of optimal income tax structures employed a model in which
there was a continuum of individuals. (Mirrlees, 1971). A rigorous analysis
of that problem entails a large number of mathematical niceties, which are
18discussed by Mirrlees (1976, 1985). Here, we ignore these and follow the
approach of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) using Pontryagin's technique.
It is assumed that the distribution of individuals by ability is given by
F(w). The problem of the government is to maximize
JU(C(w) ,Y(w)/w)dF(w) (18)
subject to the national income constraint
R* +J[C(w)
-Y(w)]dF(w)=0 (19)
and subject to the self-selection constraints, which here take on the simple
form that utility must increase with w which we write (making use of the first
order condition for utility maximization)
dU/dw -UY/w2 (20)
Here, we follow Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980] in analyzing a slightly more
general form of the problem, employing a social welfare function
W =JG(U)dF(w). (21)
Utilitarianism involves the special case of G1. The Rawlsian social welfare
function is W =Umjn•Egalitarian social welfare functions entail G"0, the
social marginal utility of income is non-increasing in utility.
Form the Hamiltonian,
H [G(U) -T(C-Y)]-XdU/dw, (22)
dw
and let U be our "state variable" (like capital in an intertemporal problem),
and L(w) be the control variable (like investment in the typical optimal
accumulation problem )--knowing L and U determines Y(w) =wL(w)and C(w) (from
the equation U(w)= U(C(w), L(w)). Now take the derivative of H with respect to
L:
=w-(dC/dL)1}f -A(L. (4JL'\ = 0 (23)
8L dwJ)
19where f =dF/dw,the density function, and where =-
kdL)U U0.
Rearranging, we obtain (using (16))
T' NTR= X (i(Lf dw
where T' is the marginal tax rate (MTR).
With seperate utility functions
i_ = -U,L - Ldw) w w
so we can write
MTR = U, (1 +*) (23')
Zf w
where
=L!L,the elasticity of marginal (dis)utility of labor.
Again making use of the individual's first order condition, we can rewrite
(23') as
-T')=UX(w)(1 + *)/fw (25)
Thus (25) implies that the marginal tax rate depends on four factors:
(a) the marginal tax rate is lower, the larger the fraction of the population
f at the particular income level that pays that marginal tax rate; one doesn't
want to impose large distortions where there are many people;
(b) the marginal tax rate is lower, the smaller is X(w), the shadow price on
the self-selection constraint. Analyzing X(w) is a rather complicated matter.
For the Rawlsian social welfare function, it is monotonically decreasing. For
the utilitarian social welfare function, it increases and then decreases. The
20one general result that holds (for ability distributions with a finite range)
iS18 that at the extreme, the marginal tax rate on the highest income (ability)
individual should be zero. This result corresponds to the result noted earlier
in the two group model. It is often cited as one of the few general,
qualitative propositions to arise from the theory of optimal taxation, but in
fact, as we shall see, it is not a very general result. The intuition behind
the result is simple: one of the advantages of increasing the marginal tax
rate at a particular income level is that the average tax rate of those at
higher income levels is increased (keeping their marginal tax rates
unchanged). The distortion (dead weight loss) arising from any tax is
associated with the marginal tax rate; thus increasing the average tax rate on
an individual while keeping the marginal tax rate the same increases revenues
without increasing the deadweight loss.
(c) the marginal tax rate is lower (other things being equal) the higher the
productivity of the group; that is, the loss in output from distortionary
taxation is more important from groups whose output per unit of labor is
higher.
18Note that the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state
value is equal to minus the derivative of the associated shadow price with
respect to the running variable:
- = = (G'- f +XL.U(\
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using the fact that at w wm&z, X(w) =0.
For a general discussion of the conditions under which this limiting
result obtains, see E. Sadka [1976] and J. K. Seade [1977].
21(d) the marginal tax rate is lower the higher is the labor supply response.
To see this, we consider the special case of a separable utility function (so
UCL 0). In that case, it is easy to show that the compensated elasticity of
labor supply (in the absence of taxation) is just c*.
4. Some mathematical problems. The maximization problems with which we have
been concerned here are not well behaved. Even though the individual utility
functions are, the self-selection constraints are not (in general.) This has
several consequences. First, of course, there may be allocations which satisfy
the Pontryagin first order conditions but are not the global optimum (and
indeed may be a local minimum.)
Secondly, if the government can implement random tax policies, it may wish
to do so (see below). But even if the government cannot, or does not, wish to
implement random tax policies, it must be concerned lest individuals randomize,
unless, of course, the government can prohibit such gambling (which seems
unlikely, since that would require that it differentiate between "naturally"
occurring risks and artificially created risks19 ).Recallour earlier result
that the marginal tax rate on the highest income individual is zero. This,
combined with the fact that his average tax rate is positive, and, if the tax
system is at all redistributive, the fact that the average tax rate on poor
individuals must be negative implies that there must be a region in which the
function giving after tax income as a function of before tax income must be
convex (see figure 10). If individuals are not too risk averse, they will,
accordingly, attempt to randomize; indeed an employer who offered any
19Evenif it could prohibit artificially created gambles,
it would simply encourage individuals to undertake naturally
occurring gambles, even if they were not quite actuarially fair.
22individual whose before tax income was in the convex region a random pay could
increase his profits. Unfortunately, there does not exist a correct analysis
of Pareto efficient (or optimal) tax structure taking into account this class
of responses to the tax structure. Note that this problem does not arise in
the analysis of linear tax structures.
Non-differentiability In the analysis of a continuum of types we have
implicitly assumed that the optimal tax function will be differentiable. It
may well not be. There is an interesting interpretation to these points of
non-differentiability. Note in figure 11 that if the consumption function is
not differentiable, there will be a range of types of individuals who will not
be distinguishable, i.e., who will choose precisely the same point (have the
same income). Thus, it may be optimal to have a partially pooling equilibrium,
and this corresponds precisely to the circumstances under which the tax
function is not differentiable.
To see why with three or more groups partial pooling may be desirable,
turn to figure 12, where there are just three groups. Assume we fix the
utility of the high ability (type 2) and the low ability (type 0). As we raise
U, the revenue we obtain from that group decreases (since we are moving along
U2's indifference curve, and below E2, its slope is less than unity.) But the
revenue we raise from group 0 may be increased if the slope of U is less than
unity at E0. Clearly, if there are relatively few type l's, Pareto efficiency
requires a pooling equilibrium in which types 0 and 1 cannot be differentiated.
We can use Pontryagin's technique to analyze Pareto efficient tax
23structures with non-differentiabilities, and derive conditions under which
partial pooling is desirable. 20
Discontinuities. Even if we preclude randomization (gambling), since the tax
function is at least partially convex, and the indifference curves are convex,
it is possible that there be multiple tangencies between the indifference curve
and the function relating after tax to before tax income. Under these
circumstances, small changes in the tax (consumption) function could cause
seemingly large changes in revenues. However, if we assume a continuum of
individuals, and if we give the government the right to assign a given
proportion of any group which is indifferent between two allocations to each of
the allocations, then it is clear that this presents no serious problem to the
analysis.2'
Generalizations: Random taxation.22Thischapter is concerned with the
analysis of Pareto efficient tax structures. Whether a given tax structure can
or cannot be improved upon depends crucially on the set of admissable tax
structures. Indeed, this is perhaps one of the central lessons to emerge from
the literature during the past two decades. (See also Dasgupta-Stiglitz
[1971].)
Unfortunately, there is no agreement about how to define the set of
admissible tax structures. Presumably, this should be related to the
20 See Stiglitz (1977) for an analysis in the context of
the monopoly insurance problem.
21 See Mirrlees (1976,1985) for a detailed discussion of
the mathematical problems posed by the optimal tax problem.
• 22This section draws heavily upon Arnott and Stiglitz (1986)
and Stiglitz (1982).
24technology of tax collection; to the costs to the government of monitoring, or
to the private sector of compliance (or of non-compliance); and to the accuracy
with which it can monitor the relevant variables. And these costs are likely
to differ across countries, and to change over time. Most of the analyses,
however, simply begin by postulating the admissible tax structure.
There are those who contend that the tax structures analyzed so far are
overly restrictive, and those who contend that they are not restrictive enough.
We take up each of these allegations in the next two sections.
Those who contend that we have been overly restrictive in our analysis
point out that we should at least consider the possibility of random taxes.23
It turns out, in fact, that under a variety of situations, random
taxation is desirable. This can take on two forms. In ex ante randomization
the government randomly assigns individuals to one of two tax schedules; if the
tax is purely redistributive the net revenue raised by one is equal to the net
loss of the other. The desirability of this can be seen most simply in the
case where the government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. We
can then plot average social welfare as a function of the revenue raised, R; if
there is a convex region, then for some values of R (in the diagram between R1
and R2) then ex ante randomization is desirable. Arnott and Stiglitz derive
conditions under which this can occur. More generally, if the government raises
revenues (for expenditures other than redistribution) and if welfare is a
nonconcave function of revenue raised, ex ante randomization may be desirable.
(See Figure 13.)
23Other more general tax structures include those which make
taxes a function of wages. If wages are a function of effort one
could not obtain a first best outcome even were wages observable.
See also part II below.
25In ex post randomization, the individual is not told what his tax schedule
is until after he has announced his ability type. This kind of randomization
may be a way of loosening the self-selection constraints. If, for instance,
the more able individuals were much more risk averse than the less able, by
randomizing the taxes paid by the less able, the government makes it less
attractive for the more able to attempt to pretend to be less able. This in
turn implies that the distortionary tax imposed on the poor may be reduced.
This can be seen most simply by considering figure 14 where we choose two
points on the poor individual's indifference curve yielding the same average
government revenue as the original point E1. This randomization has no effect
on the poor or on government revenue. But as risk aversion increases, the
utility of the rich approaches the utility associated with the worst of the
outcomes (from his perspective); hence we can effect a Pareto improvement.24
What are we to make of these results? Though they might indeed provide a
rationale for the seeming capriciousness with which taxes are sometimes
imposed, we doubt whether such a policy would ever be openly argued- -and voted
for- -ina democratic society. Our results show that the principle of
horizontal equity -- thatotherwise identical individuals should be treated the
same -maynot only not be derivable from a utilitarian social welfare
function, but that that principle may in fact be inconsistent with the
principle of Pareto efficiency (at least on an ex ante expected utility basis.)
I suspect that it is because of the possibilities of abuse- -the belief
that a random tax would not in fact be random, that the die would be loaded in
24Iam indebted to Steve Slutsky for this argument.
26favor of those in political power- -that a proposal for tax randomization would
meet such opposition.25
Still, the analysis of random taxation is of interest for several reasons:
First, it serves to remind us of the difficulties of defining the set of
admissable taxes, and that our models may be -indeedprobably are -leaving
out some important considerations in determining tax structures.
Secondly, some of the properties of optimal tax structures may reflect an
attempt to introduce randomization surreptitiously. Assume, for instance, that
there were two types of labor, denoted M and W, which in all production and
consumption characteristics were identical. In those circumstances in which ex
ante randomization is desirable, the optimal tax will "tell" us to impose
different tax structures on the two groups. Most of us would say that that
should not be allowed. But what if the two groups are slightly different? How
different should they be to make differential taxation admissible. The theory
gives us no guidance on this issue.
This issue arises even more forcefully in Part II where we consider
commodity taxation. Consider two groups of individuals who are identical
except that one prefers chocolate ice cream, the other vanilla ice cream. In
those cases where tax randomization is desirable, we will be told to tax
vanilla and chocolate at different rates. But is this any more acceptable than
randomizingtaxes?'
6. Limitations: Restricted Taxation
250neimportant exception to the general presumption against randomization
is in law enforcement. It is often argued that efficient law enforcement
entails large fines imposed rarely. Another exception is provided by the draft
lottery.
27So far, we have assumed that there are no restrictions on the type of
consumption (wage) tax which the government can impose. The tax schedules may
be highly non-linear, with marginal tax rates increasing over some intervals
and decreasing over others. The tax schedules which typically emerge from
these analyses are far more complex than those currently employed in the U.S.
Curiously enough, a major focus of tax reform discussions in the United States
has been simplifying the tax structure, by having a single marginal rate (the
flat tax, or linear income tax). Non-linear tax structures present problems
with income averaging. The unit of taxation becomes important--under the
current U.S. tax system there are strong incentives for income shifting.
Moreover, decreasing marginal rates26 provide incentives for gambling (for
firms to pay random wages).27 Non-linear tax schedules open up large
opportunities for tax arbitrage and its inequities and inefficiencies. One of
the major advantages of a flat rate tax is that it enables income to be taxed
at source, thus reducing considerably the administrative and compliance costs
of the income tax.28
We noted earlier that the underlying problem in the analysis of income
taxation is an information problem: if the government could perfectly tell who
is of what ability, it could impose lump sum redistributive taxes. But the
government can only make inferences about who is of what ability by the income
they receive. The problems we have just been discussing can also be viewed as
26Recall the standard result that the marginal rate for the
highest income individual should be zero; hence, the optimal tax
schedule (as usually defined) entails decreasing marginal rates
over at least some interval.
27See the discussion above, section 4.
28For an excellent discussion of the advantages of a flat
tax, see Hall and Rabushka.
28information problems. The government cannot perfectly and costlessly observe
the income or consumption of each individual; if it could, there would be no
compliance or administrative costs associated with running a non-linear tax
system.
Opposing these objections to a highly non-linear tax are the possible
increases in social welfare from the greater redistribution that can be
achieved through a non-linear tax. If there were no administrative costs,
etc., it is easy to show that a non-linear tax Pareto dominates a linear tax.
But there is a growing consensus in the United States that the problems as-
sociated with very non-linear tax schedules outweigh these gains in
redistribution.29 Whether there would be significant gains in going from a
flat rate tax, to a two or three tier schedule, remains a question of on-going
research.
A number of economists have analyzed the optimal linear tax.3° This
problem is a fairly simple one: a tax schedule is described by an equation of
the form
C =I+ (1-t)Y, (26)
where I is the lump sum payment to each individual, and t is the marginal tax
rate. We express individual utilities in terms of the indirect utility
function,giving utility as a function of the after taxwageandlumpsum
transfer,v*(w(I-t),I).The government looks for that feasible taxstructure
which maximizes social welfare,that is, it solves
29Theseviews are reinforced by Mirrlees' calculations
(1971) suggesting that the optimal tax structure is close to
linear.
30See, in particular, A. K. Dixit and A. Sandmo, [1977] and J. E.
Stiglitz [1976b1. The discussion here follows closely along the lines of the





R +J[C(w)- L(w)w}dF(w) = R+I-tJ L(w)wdF(w) ￿O,(28)
where R is the revenue which the government is required to raise for financing
public goods (may be zero). The condition simply says that the aggregate value
of expenditures on public goods plus private consumption equals the aggregate
value of output. Note that the objective function is the same as that employed
in our earlier analysis; the only difference is that while before, any tax
function was admissible, now we are restricted to linear tax functions.
Three general results can be obtained:
(a) If R ￿ 0, then the optimal linear tax entails I >0.The marginal
deadweight loss from a very small tax is negligible, but the gain in
redistribution is positive;
(b) If R is large enough, then I <0;indeed, since in general an increase in
a proportional tax beyond a certain point will actually decrease revenues, if R
exceeds the maximal revenue that can be raised through a proportional tax, the
government will have to supplement it with a uniform lump sum levy. More
generally, the greater is R, the smaller is I.
(c) The optimal taxformulacan be written in a remarkably simple form:
t/(l-t) =- coy[b, Y]/ JYtdF, (29)
where
b= G'cx/+tw (aL/al), the net social marginal valuation of income,31
31The first term is the direct effect of giving an extra
dollar to an individual (normalized by the value of a dollar to
the government), while the second term is the change in revenue
to the government resulting from the fact that the individual
will alter his labor supply as a result.
30a =au/ac,themarginal utility of income,
=themarginal value of a dollar to the government (the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint)
coy (b,Y) =E(b-Eb)(Y-EY),the covariance between b (defined
above) and Y, and c =compensatedelasticity of labor supply.32
The covariance may be seen as a marginal measure of inequality. Consider,
in particular, the case of a small tax, so b G'a/Z, with R =0If we gave a
lump sum payment to everyone, financed by a tax at rate t, I =tEY,where EY is
mean income. The increment in social welfare is thus JtG'a (EY -Y)dF=
-tZcoy (b,Y).
32To obtain this result, we form the Lagrangian
£=JG+(twL-I-R)]dF (30)
and differentiate with respect to I and t to obtain
J[G'u +(tw (L/3I) -1)]dF=0 (31)
and
J[G'(aU/at) + (wL + tw(aL/at)] dF =0. (32)
The first condition can be written simply as
Eb =1.




and the definition of L[w(l-t)/L](aL/aw) ,toobtain
U
JwL(G'a-Z[l-tw(aL/aw) /L -tw(aL/aI)})dF=0
or, dividing through byand using the fact that Eb =1,
JY(b
-Eb+ tLL/(1t)) dF =0.
31Thus, our basic formula says that the tax rate should be greater, the
greater this measure of marginal inequality, and the smaller the (weighted
average) compensated elasticity of labor supply. The marginal measure of
inequality will be greater, the more egalitarian the social welfare function,
i.e. the larger -G"U/G'.
7. Limitations: The Push-Pin versus Poetry Controversy. While the New
Welfare Economics emphasized the impossibility of interpersonal utility
comparisons, much of the recent work in optimal tax theory has simply ignored
these concerns. By positing that all individuals have the same indifference
curves between leisure and consumption, they could simply assert that all had
the same utility function; there seemed a "natural" way of making interpersonal
utility comparisons. Three problems were thus ignored.
First, there are many alternative ways of representing the same family of
indifference maps. Each representation would yield a different optimal income
tax. The literature has developed no persuasive way for choosing among these
alternative representations.
Secondly, when indifference curves cross, as in figure 15, then one must
decide which of 2's indifference curves corresponds to the indifference curve
of individual 1 that we have labeled a. This choice too will have a critical
effect on the desired income tax rate.
Thirdly, conventional models have assumed that individuals who are more
productive in the work place have the same capacity for enjoyment of goods.
The relationship between these two capacities troubled the early utilitarians,
The fact that there was no resolution of the ensuing controversy does not mean
that the issues should be ignored. In particular, the consequences can be seen
most forcefully within the strand of modern economic theory which has
32emphasized the role of home production. Assume that individuals do not consume
the goods they produce directly, but rather transform purchased goods into true
consumption goods. Thus, for simplicity, assume that there is a single ultimate
good which the consumer is consuming (e.g., book reading), with U = U(Q). The
output of this good, Q, is a function of the input of time (leisure) and of
goods (C): the functional relationship will differ from individual to indivi-
dual, depending on the abilities of individuals in household production, h,.
Such a model has important- -and probably not completely
acceptable- -implications within a utilitarian framework. Assume that Q is
Cobb-Douglas and normalize the available time for market plus home production
at unity,
Q = Ca(l —L)1h= wahL(l —
Then,in a free market economy, all individuals will supply labor equal to
L=a
The marginal utility of income of an individual of market productivity w and
home productivity h is equal to
MU = aU' (Q)Ca_l(l_L)l_&h = aa(i —a)1_aU'(Q)hwa_1
Letting home productivity depend on market productivity,
h1 = h(w), dln h/din w = x
anddifferentiating, we obtain
dlnMU=(a-l)+h.!.w+U"Q[a+k!.J<O
dlnw h U' h >
asR> p+x-l
<a+x
where R is the elasticity of marginal utility.
33Assume, for instance, that h is proportional to w, so x =1.
Then so long asR < a ,thereshould be redistribution
a+ 1
towards individuals with higher wages. Although h is in principle observable
(by detailed observation of the individual within the home), there is, in this
example, no way we can infer from observing individualts behavior in the market
place (i.e., his labor supply) his home productivity. It would appear then,
that one cannot derive, on the basis of the utilitarian ethic, a general case
in favor of redistribution from those who have high wages in the market to
those with low wages. Such an argument requires specific assumptions
concerning the rate at which marginal utility diminishes, the relationship
between home and market productivity, and characteristics of the home
production process. Yet, there is more widespread agreement that there ought
to be redistribution from the more able to the less able than this utilitarian
analysis would suggest. These considerations--as well as the practical
considerations entailed in deciding upon the appropriate cardinalization within
the utilitarian framework--make the utilitarian approach questionable as a
guide to policy.
8.Limitations: General Equilibrium Effects of Taxation.
Traditional tax theory has been much concerned with the incidence of
taxation, with the extent to which taxes are shifted. There has been concern,
for instance, that taxes on doctors and lawyers simply result in higher fees.
This central issue of the incidence of taxation was completely ignored in the
early analyses of optimal income taxation; it was simply assumed that the
before tax wage of an individual would be unaffected by the imposition of a
tax. Several recent papers have called attention to the potentially important
34consequences of these general equilibrium effects.33 Consider, for instance, a
modified version of the two group model presented in the first section. There,
we assumed that the productivity (output per man hour) of each group was
fixed. Now, assume that the two groups provide different kinds of labor
services (skilled versus unskilled labor). The relative wage will then depend
on the relative supplies of the two types of labor. If the labor supply of the
skilled is relatively elastic, and of the unskilled relatively inelastic, then
a uniform marginal tax rate on both might increase the before tax relative wage
of the skilled; to offset this, one might wish to have a lower marginal tax
rate on the skilled.
Indeed, Stiglitz (1982) has shown that (in the standard case where it is
the high ability self-selection constraint which is binding) Pareto efficient
taxation requires that the marginal tax rate on the most able individual should
be ne2ative. except in the limitin2 case where the two types of labor are
perfect substitutes. in which case it is zero.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Since there is a deadweight
loss from redistributing income, it is always desirable to incur some small
deadweight loss to change the before tax distribution of income in a desirable
manner.
Stiglitz also shows that while the marginal tax rate on the less able is
always positive. its magnitude denends on the elasticity of substitution: the
smaller the elasticity of substitution, the larger the marginal tax rate. The
government increasin2lv relies on the general equilibrium incidence of the tax,
the change in the before tax relative wages. to redistribute income.
33See F. Allen(l982), N. Stern (1982), M. Feldstein (1973),
and J. E. Stiglitz (1982, 1985).
35*Formal proof. These results can be seen more formally as follows.




where F exhibits constant returns to scale. If each factor




We can now write the Lagrangian
£ =V2+ iV1





+ X2(V2(C2,Y2; w2) -V2(C,Y1;w2)self-selection
constraint
+ (w1 -g(n)) (35)
where we have expressed the resource constraint making use of the aggregate
production function: we have appended the constraint on the value of w1; and we
focus on the case where the upper self-selection constraint is binding. Then
straightforward differentiation yields
= +XV -ZN2=0
C2 ac2 ac2 (36a)
=3a+X28V2 + N2-g'n/Y2=0
aY2 a; a; (36b)
Dividing (36h) by (36a) gives
-ay2,ay2=1-g'n (37)
av2/ac2 N2Y2
36that is, unless f" 0, that is, unless the elasticity of substitution is
infinity, the more productive individual should work beyond the point where the
slope of his indifference curve (in C,Y space) is unity, that is, he should
face a negative marginal tax rate.34
9.Other Limitations on the General Model
Twootherlimitations on the general model should be noted. First, we
have assumed that income is a non-stochastic function of effort. Views about
the desirability of progressive taxation are often related to views concerning
the extent to which differences in income are due to differences in effort, to
differences in ability, or to differences in luck.35
Secondly, we have assumed that income is monitored perfectly. In fact,
measured income can be viewed as a noisy signal of true income. Using the
techniques developed by Radner andStiglitz,36it should be possible to show
that if it is a noisy enough signal, then it will not be desirable to
differentiate among individuals on that basis (using, say, a utilitarian social
welfare function.) The gains in redistribution will be more than offset by the
costs.37 (See also Stern [1982].)
34The proof presented here is rather different from that presented in
Stiglitz (1982), which re-expressed the problem in terms of the control
variables L and C,. The proof here uses the fact that •> 0,i.e. welfare
would be raised if unskilled workers were paid a wage in excess of their
marginal product.
35For a brief discussion on optimal taxation with stochastic
income, see Stiglitz (1982).
36See R. Radner andJ:E. Stiglitz (1984)
37Another line of research is concerned with ascertaining
conditions for the optimal allocation of resources to monitoring.
3710. Numerical Calculations. We have seen that only limited qualitative
results concerning the nature of the optimal tax schedule have been derived.
Several economists have attempted to calculate the optimal tax schedule, making
particular assumptions concerning the distribution of abilities, the social
welfare function, and individuals' utility functions. Not surprisingly, the
results seem to vary greatly with the particular assumptions employed. The
elasticity of labor supply is obviously critical in determining the extent of
our concern with incentive effects, and unfortunately, there is no agreement
among economists about the magnitude of this. The more egalitarian the social
welfare function, the larger the role to be played by redistributive taxation.
As an example, Mirrlees calculated the optimal income tax for a utilitarian
social welfare function, assuming the special utility function
U =logC +log (1 -L)
and a lognormal distribution for w. The schedule he obtained was remarkably
close to linear. (See Table 1). By contrast, Atkinson analyzed the optimal
tax schedule for the same problem, assuming a Rawlsian social welfare function.
He obtained increasing average but decreasing marginal tax rates.38
Welfare Gains
One of the major thrusts of the recent research in optimal taxation has
been its concern with the incentive effects of redistributive taxation. Given
an equalitarian social welfare function, there are gains from a more equal
distribution of income, but there are losses from the distortions associated
38See A. B. Atkinson, "Maxi-min and Optimal Income Taxa-
tion", paper presented at the Budapest meeting of the Econometric
Society, 1972. For other numerical calculations, see N. H.
Stern, "On the Specification of Models of Optimum Income Taxa-
tion", Journal of Public Economics, 1976, 6, 123-162.
38with the income tax. The question is, how significant are the gains relative
to the costs? The answer clearly depends on at least three critical
assumptions: how elastic the (compensated) labor supply is; how averse to
inequality society is; and how large a share in national income government
expenditure is. For a utilitarian social welfare function, with "reasonable"
estimates of the compensated labor supply function, Stiglitz [1976b] suggested
that the welfare gains to be achieved by the optimal linear income tax were
minimal, without counting the administrative costs associated with the tax.
II. Pareto Efficient Taxation With Many Commodities
and ManyPeriods
11. Alternative TaxBases
So far, we have focused our attention on the analysis of an optimal wage
tax.Othertaxand expenditurepolicies have often been employed as
redistributivedevices. Most governments impose taxes on such luxuries as
perfumes, and many governments provide subsidies for such necessities as food.
There was a widespread feeling (perhaps best articulated by M. Friedman)
that the government should concentrate its redistributive policies within the
income tax. Using excise taxes to redistribute simply added additional
distortions. Clearly, if labor were inelastically supplied, then an optimally
designedwage tax would be all that is required. But labor is not inelas-
ticallysupplied, and, as Ramsey (1927) forcefullyestablished more than fifty
yearsago, counting the number of distortions is no way to do welfare
analysis. If we have an optimally designed income tax, should we supplement it
39with excise taxes? The heuristic argument, that by doing so, we impose less of
a burden on the income tax, seems persuasive, but unfortunately is incorrect.
The answer turns out to depend simply on whether the utility function is
separable between the vector of consumption goods and work, i.e. on how changes
in leisure affect individual marginal rates of substitution between different
consumption goods. If the utility function is separable between consumption
and leisure C U =u(C)-v(L). where C is a vector) then all Pareto efficient
tax structures entail no taxation of commodities.
11.1 Formal Analysis
The result can be seen most simply in the context of our two group model.
If we now interpret C as a vector, the Lagrangian for this problem is identical
to that formulated earlier (section 2.2), except the government budget




If we now differentiate
the analogous equations (12)
ac1
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(39d)We again focus on the case where A1 =0and A2 > 0: only




av1iac1 = + X2av2iac1 (40b)
aV1/aClk N1 + A2av/c1
Eq.(40a) yields the familiar result that there should be no
distortionary taxation on the individual with the highest
ability. The interpretation of (40b) is however somewhat more
subtle. Consider first the case where individuals have separable
utility functions between leisure andgoods,i.e.
a2ui=0,all i,j.
3C,, aL







We have thus established our basic result that: If leisure and goods are
separable, there should be no commodity taxation It should be noted that in
this analysis we allow tax functions which are not only non-linear functions of
consumption, but are also not separable, i.e. the marginal rate imposed on the
41consumption of commodity j may depend not only on the consumption of commodity
j but on other commodities as well.
If the utility function is not separable, we obtain
- =x2(i1 - (44)
ac aclk)
or












Thus, whether commodity j should be taxed or subsidized relative to k
depends on whether the more able individuals's marginal rate of substitution of
j for k exceeds that of the low ability person, or conversely.
In the case we have focused on, where the low ability and high ability
individuals have the same utility function, the relative values of the marginal
rate of substitution depend simply on how the amount of leisure affects the
marginal rate of substitution. The critical parameter that has to be
estimated, then, for determing the structure of commodity taxes is
din UkLLj.
dinL
The result that, with separability, only an income tax is needed, which
seemed so surprising at first becomes entirely understandable within this
42framework; if the two groups of individuals have the same indifference curves
(locally) between two commodities we cannot use the differential taxation as a
basis of separation; if they differ, we can. By taxing the commodity which the
more able individual values more highly in the lower ability individual's
package, we make the lower ability individual's "package" less attractive to
him.(Since in this model both groups have identical utility functions, the
only difference in the evaluation of a given consumption bundle arises from the
differences in leisure which they enjoy at any given level of income.) We thus
can tax the higher ability individual more heavily without having him trying to
"disguise" himself as a low ability person.
11.2 Ramsey vs. Atkinson-Sti2litz Pareto Efficient Taxation.
The results we have just obtained stand in marked contrast to standard
results on the design of commodity tax structures.39 In the simple form (where
the compensated demand for each commodity depends only on its own price, and
where producer prices are fixed) optimal taxation entails tax rates which are
inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand; in the more general case,
optimal taxation calls for an equal percentage reduction of consumption (again
along the compensated demand curves) for all commodities.4° The factors which
are relevant for optimal Atkinson-Stiglitz pricing are completely different;
39The list of contributors to this literature is enormous.
For a comprehensive survey, see the chapter by A. Auerbach, this
volume. Besides the classic papers by Ramsey [1927), and Boiteux
[1956], important contributions by Diamond and Mirrlees [1971],
Baumol and Bradford [1970], Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1971],
Atkinson and Stiglitz [1972, 1976], Diamond [1975], Meade [1955],
Corlett and Hague [1953] may be noted.
40Both results assume all individuals are identical, so that
distributional considerations can be ignored. See below.
43there, all that is relevant is how the marginal rate of substitution between
two commodities changes as the amount of leisure changes.
This poses a problem: which theory provides the appropriate bases for the
design of tax policy? How can these alternative approaches be reconciled?
Ramsey's analysis (and much of the subsequent work which developed from
it) was based on an artificial problem: he assumed that all individuals were
identical, but that the government could riot impose a lump sum tax. As we
noted earlier, there is really no reason the government cannot impose a uniform
lump sum tax; what the government cannot do is levy lump sum taxes which vary
according to the individual's ability to pay. But if all individuals are
identical, then a uniform lump sum tax is the optimal tax. Our analysis has
assumed not only that the government can impose a uniform lump sum tax, but
that it can impose a non-linear consumption (wage) tax. Giving the government
thisadditional instrument is what changes the nature of the optimal commodity
tax structure.
Virtuallyall developed countries impose some income tax, which makes
Ramsey's analysis inapplicable to those countries. On the other hand, for a
variety of reasons, many less developed countries do not impose a very
effective income tax. For these, Ramsey's analysis might seem appropriate; but
Ramsey (and the subsequent work cited in footnote 38) assumed a neoclassical
model of the economy, a model which is particularly ill suited for less
developed countries. In a later section, we describe briefly recent work
attempting to extend this kind of analysis to less developed countries.
4412.3 Redistributive commodity taxes with optimal linear income taxes.
In the previous section, we noted the limited role to be played by
redistributive commodity taxation when there is an optimal consumption tax. Is
that still true if there is an optimal linear consumption (or income) tax?
The answer is provided by the generalized Ramsey Rule (Atkinson Stiglitz
[1976]):
Z E t Shik/HCk=ek, (45)
ih
where
S',k is the hth household's compensated price derivative of the ith
commodity with respect to the kth price;
ek =S (Ckhbb)/ HCkEb (46)
the normalized covariance between C'k and b'. (Generally, goods which are
consumed by the rich will have a high absolute value of ek. It is a measure of
the extent to which the good is consumed by those with low values of social
marginal utility of income);
H is the total number of households;
HCk is the aggregate consumption of commodity k (Ck is the average
consumption); and b is the net marginal social utility of income, as defined
earlier.
(45) says that the percentage reduction in consumption of each commodity
(along the compensated demand curve) should be proportional to its
distributional characteristic ek. This stands in contrast to the standard
45Ramsey result that the percentage reduction should be the same for all
commodities 41
Another special case is that originally investigated by Ramsey, where
there is constant marginal utility of income and separable demand functions.
When wage differences are the only sources of inequality, this implies that we
can write the demand curves as
C = C1(q/wh)
where w' is the wage of the hth individual. Moreover,
bhi =
where, it will be recalled, is the marginal utility of income to the
government. Now, the optimality condition (45)becomes
tk E (C'k/w') = Z (b's -Eb)(C'k
—Ck) (48)
h h
Let Vh = l/w'. Taking a Taylor series approximation of the right hand side, we
obtain (setting, without loss of generality, Ev = 1, and expressing all
aggregate results in per capita terms)42
t kvk /
whiletaking a Taylor series approximation to the left hand side yields
tk E(Ch/wb) tkC'k{l + -m,ck/2}icc2,
h
where
= -C"q/C',the elasticity of demand, and
411n fact, both results are special cases of the more general result of
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976).
Z E tiShik/HCk = Eb8k -(1
-Eb). (47)
With an optimal linear income tax Eb = 1.If all individuals are identical (as
in Ramsey's original analysis) 6k=
42Recall thatEb = 1.
46mk =Cttlq/Ctt.
Thus
tk/Qk —2/[1+ - mkh/2lc1V}.
Noticethat for the quadratic utility function, £k=m,=0,souniform
taxationis again optimal. More generally, even to a first order
approximation, the relative tax rates will depend not only on the elasticity of
demand, but also on mk, a parameter which is hard to estimate. Assuming that
the demand curves exhibit constant elasticity has, in particular, strong
implications for the structure of optimal commodity taxes. Finally, note that
tkdoesnot vary inversely with the elasticity of demand, even for constant
elasticity demand functions.
In short, if there is an income tax, the role for indirect taxation is
greatly changed, and if commodity taxes are imposed, the optimal structure of
these taxes may depend on parameters other than those that it depended on in
the absence of an income tax, parameters for which it seems intrinsically hard
to obtain reliable estimates; and even in those special cases where the only
demand parameter on which the structure of taxes depends is the elasticity of
demand, it does not vary simply inversely with the demand elasticity.
12.4 Other Forms of Restricted Taxation. In the previous subsection, we noted
the important consequences of restrictions on taxation: the optimal commodity
tax structure depended critically on whether there was or was not an income
tax, and whether, if there was an income tax, it was restricted to being
linear. With linear demand curves derived from a utility function of the form
Eb(Q -Qr)2-aL,
it is so easy to show that (45) implies that there should be no commodity
taxation (Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976, 1980)). Deaton (1979) has shown that this
47holds for more general classes of utility functions, including the frequently
estimated linear expenditure system.
Another important example where restrictions on taxation have an important
implication for tax structure arises when the government cannot impose 100%
profits taxes. No government does this, perhaps because of the difficulty of
differentiating between true profits (in the sense that economists use that
term) and return to capital or to entrepreneurship. With 100% profits taxes,
the commodity tax structure depends simply on properties of the demand curves,
and there should be no taxation of producers (which would interfere with the
production efficiency of the economy).4' The former result conflicts with
Ramsey's original prescription, where optimal tax rates depended on both the
demand and supply elasticities. The reconciliation was provided by Stiglitz
and Dasgupta [1971], who showed that if there were not 100% profits taxes,
producer taxation may be desirable, and optimal commodity taxes would depend on
supply elasticities. Ramsey had implicitly assumed no profits taxes.
13. Implications for Capital Taxation.
Consumption at different dates is, of course like consumption of different
commodities. Thus, the Atkinson-Stiglitz results provide the suggestion of an
answer to the long standing controversy on whether interest income should be
taxed. Early advocates of a consumption tax (taxing consumption is equivalent
to exempting interest) emphasized that it was both equitable (individuals
should be taxed on what they take out of society- -their consumption- -and not
43This result was first established by Diamond and Mirrlees [1971].
For a simple interpretation of that result see Stiglitz and
Dasgupta [1971].
48what they contribute- -their income44 )andmore efficient (since it did not
introduce the additional intertemporal distortion.)45 Ramsey's analysis of
optimal taxation should have made the latter argument suspect even before
Kaldor put it forward: fewer distortions are not necessarily better than more.
Indeed, Ramsey's analysis suggested that whether consumption at later dates
should be taxed at a higher or lower rate should depend on the elasticity of
demand for consumption at later dates relative to the elasticity at earlier
dates.
The Atkinson-Stiglitz analysis provided a framework within which both the
equity and efficiency issues could be addressed. They showed that if there was
separability between consumption (at all dates) and work. then a consumption
tax was Pareto efficient.
Still, that did not close the matter, for theirs was a partial equilibrium
model. We noted earlier (section 8) that general equilibrium effects of tax
policy must be taken into account when tax policy can affect factor prices.
Partial equilibrium models cannot address the effects of taxation on savings
and investment, and hence on the intertemporal distribution of income. These
questions have been addressed by two sets of models.
Overlapping Generations Models. Stiglitz (1985) has extended the
Atkinson-Stiglitz analysis using an overlapping generations. He asked, what
can we say in that context about the set of Pareto efficient tax structures.
Three results stand out:
1.If relative wages between the skilled and unskilled workers is fixed
(independent of the capital stock), then the partial equilibrium results remain
This is the position most associated with Irving Fisher.
45See for instance Kaldor
49valid: provided there is separability in the utility functions, Pareto
efficiency requires that there be a consumption tax.46
2.If relative wages between the skilled and unskilled workers changes with
the level of capital accumulation, the government will, in general, wish either
to have an interest income tax or subsidy. The intuitive reason is analogous
to that presented earlier concerning why, when there are these general
equilibrium effects, it would be desirable for the government to impose a
negative marginal tax rate on the more productive individuals. Here, if
increasing the level of capital increases the income of the more able relative
to the less able (for instance, if unskilled labor and capital are substitutes,
46The Lagrangian for this problem can be written
£ = +X2(U2(C2,L2) —U2(C1,L*2))
+ —K+ + EC._16 — i i
whereQ F(K,E) is the aggregate production function, E is the number of
efficiency units of labor (E = vN1L1 ÷ N2L2 ,wherev is the ratio of the
productivity of the two types of laborers), where is the Lagrange
multiplier for the resource constraint at time t; where C6 is the
consumption of the ith type in the tth generation the first year of its life,
is its consumption in the second year of its life; and as in the
standard over lapping generations model, we assume individuals live for only
two periods, working only in the first. tCitc
Note that we have written the self-selection constraint in a slightly
different form than in our earlier analysis. We define L2* as the labor that
the more able would have to supply, in order to immitate the less able (recall
that we are focusing on the case when it is the more able's self selection
constraint that is binding). Clearly, L*26 = vL1.
We obtain from the first order conditions for C and that
=
aVti/aCitt,1
i.e.the marginal rate of substitution must equal the ratio of the shadow prices
of resources; but differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to K, we obtain
+ F(K,1,E1)) =
from which the indicated result immediately follows.
50while skilled labor and capital are complements) then the government may wish
to discourage capital accumulation, and it will use tax policy to do this.
3.If the government cannot completely control the level of capital stock,
through debt or social security policy 48, as seems to be the case, then the
government will, in general, wish to use tax policy, e.g. interest income
subsidies, if it wishes to encourage savings, taxes if it wishes to discourage
accumulation.
Infinitely lived individuals. The other model which has been intensively
investigated is that of infinitely lived individuals (Judd, Chamley, Stiglitz
1985). The first two of these studies are extension, to this context, of the
standard Ramsey analysis, and the same criticisms can be raised: since they
assume identical individuals, there is no reason not simply to impose a uniform
lump sum tax. Still, their result that asymptotically there should be no tax
on capital income, is of interest.49 But as in the Atkinson Stiglitz analysis,
The analysis follows by writing the constant returns to scale
production function
QF(K,E1,E2) where E = with the two types of laborers being imperfect
substitutes. With this modification, the Lagrangian remains the same as that
presented in the previous footnote, except that now, we note that v, relative
wages, are a function of K. This means that the first order condition for K
now becomes
T,1(l +F) =+ aU2 iL
aK
The other first order conditions remain unchanged. It immediately follows that
the marignal rate of substitution is no not equal to the marginal rate of transformation.
48See Atkinson -Stiglitz (1980) for a discussion of how this can be done.
49The result is in one sense stronger than the earlier results for the
overlapping generation model, and in one sense weaker. It is stronger, in that
it does not require separability; it is weaker in that it is only valid
asymptotically. (The earlier results characterized all Pareto efficient tax
structures, and held at each moment of time.)
51as soon as there are general equilibrium effects of taxation, this result no
longer holds; that is, if there are two types of individuals, and the
government cannot offset the changes in relative wages induced by tax policy,
then it will wish to take these into consideration; even asymptotically, an
interest income tax or subsidy will, in general, be desirable.5°
The simplest way to see these results is to write the Lagrangian
=E(U52+ -5(1+ r)U.1J (f.o.c.)
+ [F(K,L) -(C+ -K)
-R]Jresource constraint
+ [w0L0 - +E(wL -EC)/rr(l+ re)] budget constraInt
where we have embedded the individual's first order condition for allocating
income among different periods; and whereis the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the individual's resource constraint and where S is the pure
rate of time preference. The first order conditions are thus
= — + -8(l+ r)U+1 - =0
aC n(1 + r)
= (1 + FR) -t-1 0.
In steady state,
5(1 + r) = 1, U = =
so
= 1 = 1
l+F,
The consumer rate of interest converges to the producer rate of interest (the
marginal rate of transformation): there is no interest income taxation.
5°ThIs result is, in some sense, more surprising than the earlier result,
because it implies that, viewed as of time 0, the ratio of consumer and
producer prices approaches (asymptotically) either zero or infinity, although
each price itself is also approaching zero.
To derive this result, we assume the government must impose uniform
taxation on wages and interest. This imposes two additional sets of
constraints
1 + r1 = 1 + r2
5213.1.Imperfect capital markets
Throughout this discussion (as in most of the rest of the literature) we
have assumed a perfect capital market, i.e. that all investors obtain the same
return. There is considerable evidence that this is not true. The reasons for
this are not hard to find: there is imperfect information concerning who are
good investors.
In an imperfect capital market, then, individuals will be characterized not
only by their labor productivity, but also by their capital productivity.5' We
then will wish to use self-selection mechanisms not only to determine who among
the population are more productive laborers but also who are more productive
investors. Assume, for simplicity, that individuals differed only in their
investment productivity.The results (Stiglitz 1986) are parallel to those
obtained earlier: the government will wish to impose an interest income tax on




We reformulate the Lagrangean, appending these two additional constraints.
Letting m and jibethe Lagrange multipliers associated with the two
constraints, now, the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to K is
+F)=+4 v,
andit immediately follows that the government will wish to take into account
the effect of a change in capital accumulation on the distribution of before
tax income. If capital and unskilled labor are substitutes, then the
government will wish to discourage the accumulation of capital, and will thus
impose an interest income tax.
5Un a perfect capital market, the most productive investors will invest
all of socieity's resources, and thus the return to capital will be the same
for all.
5314. Altruism and inheritance taxation
In the life cycle model, it is assumed that individuals do not care at all
for their children. One interpretation of the model with infinitely lived
individuals is that there is a dynastic utility function:the parent cares
about his child, the child about his child, and so on.
In the simplest form, we can assume that the utility of the tth generation
is just
=U(C,L)+
whereis the weight assigned to the utility of the children.




In this interpretation, the only savings are bequests, and hence a taxon
savings is equivalent to a tax on bequests.
The analysis of Pareto efficient taxation is little affected by the
introduction of these interdependencies in utilities: we are assumed to keep
the utility levels of all but one type of individual fixed. Thus, if we fix
the utility of all future generations, then maximizing the utility of the
current generation is equivalent to maximizing the utility he derives from his
direct consumption, which is precisely the problem we have previously solved.
To answer, however, the question about whether we wish to impose an
inheritance tax, however, we must first answer some difficult questions
concerning the formulation of the social welfare function. If each
generation's utility--including their valuation of future generation's utility-
-enters the social welfare function, we obtain
W = = Zat((6/a)t -1I U(C, L)
54t t6/a -l
where we have weighted future generation's total utility by a factor 6. Notice
now that there is a discrepancy between the way the government values future
utility and how inciividuals do. Since 2ivin increases the utility both of the
giver and the receiver. it is doubly blessed in our social welfare function.
and the government will seek to encourage it. through a bequest subsidy.
15. Commitment. In the intertemporal problems we have analyzed so far, we
have assumed that the government can commit itself to a tax structure. The
government will, however, in general be able to identify who the more able are
from actions that they take early in life. Thus, if it were not committed to a
given tax structure, the government would use this information to impose a lump
sum tax on such individuals later on in their life. Recently, Britto,
Hamilton, Slutsky, and Stiglitz have investigated the consequences of assuming
that the government cannot commit itself. Then individuals know that if they
reveal who they are early in the life, they will be confronted with a lump sum
tax. Thegovernment must take this into account in designing its tax
structure. They show that in general, the tax structureis characterized by
threephases: in thefirst, there is a pooling equilibrium, i.e. all
individualsare treated identically; then there is a period in which
separationoccurs, i.e. there is distortionary taxation; after that, the
government imposes a lump sum tax. Because individuals know that there will be
a lump sum tax later, it is harder to induce the more able to reveal (through
their actions) who they are; the effective distortion in the one period in
which the identification occurs is greater. Indeed, in some cases, where
55discount rates are low enough, with an infinitely lived individuals, the only
feasible equilibria may entail pooling.
Part III. Concluding Comments
15. Optimal Taxation in Non-neoclassical Economies
The analysis of optimal tax structures prior to 1980 focused on models
of competitive (neoclassical) economies. Pigou had earlier emphasized the use
of taxation to correct market distortions (such as externalities). The optimal
tax structure thus might be markedly different in an economy with monopolies,
externalities, and other imperfections. One of the important lessons to emerge
from the literature on optimal taxation was the important consequences of
interdependencies in demand; corrective taxation needs to take these
interdependencies into account as well. Arnott and Stiglitz [19831 provide an
example of how this may be done; economies in which there are moral hazard
problems, i.e. in which the provision of insurance affects the probability of
the occurrence of the insured-against event, are almost always constrained
Pareto inefficient;52 there always exist a set of taxes and subsidies which can
make everyone better off. They analyze the structure of the optimal set of
corrective taxes.
Similarly, when there are monopolies, expressions for the optimal tax can
be derived which can be thought of as consisting of two parts; in addition to
the standard terms, there are those correcting the monopoly distortions.
52The result on the constrained Pareto inefficiency of the
economy with imperfect information and incomplete risk markets is
in fact more general. See Greenwald and Stiglitz [19861.
56Less Developed Economies. We have also emphasized throughout our analysis
the importance of identifying the set of admissible tax instruments. This is
likely to depend on the structure of the economy; it is much easier to monitor
many transactions in developed economies than in less developed countries.
Thus, few l.d.c's have an effective income tax, and the taxation of wage income
in the rural sector appears to be a virtual impossibility. Thus, the analysis
of the design of tax structures in l.d.c.ts differs in two important respects
from the analysis we have presented earlier: (a) the set of tax instruments is
different; and (b) there may be important distortions in the economy,
e.g. wages may be set at above market clearing levels in the urban sector.53
In a series of papers, Braverman, Sah, and Stiglitz have investigated the
structure of optimal taxes and prices under a variety of assumptions concerning
the structure of the l.d.c. economy. In their analysis, they have attempted to
characterize Pareto improvements, policies which would make everyone better
off, as well as policies which would increase social welfare, under weak
assumptions concerning the structure of the social welfare function.
16. Concludin& Remarks
The literature which we have surveyed in this paper has, I believe, cast
problems of the design of tax structure into a new perspective. It has
53This may not, however, be simply because of unions or other
institutional considerations. It may be because the productivity of workers
depends on the wage they receive, and thus firms find it profit maximizing to
set wages at above market clearing levels.(See Stiglitz [1974,1982,1986a].)
54See in particular, Braverman, Sah, and Stiglitz [1982); Sah and Stiglitz
[1982,1983,1984]: and Braverman, Aim and Hammer [1983]. The latter study
entails an empirical investigation of the consequences of different tax
structures for the Korean economy. Other studies investigating the
consequences of different tax structures for other countries, using the same
basic framework, are presently underway at the World Bank.
57emphasized the informational limitations on the government. And it has
attempted to ascertain what economic theory can say about the design of tax
structures without imposing welfare judgments, i.e. to identify Pareto
efficient tax structures. As in so many other areas of economic analysis,
there are perhaps more negative results than positive ones. What taxes are
not admissible has been shown to be a crucial determinant of the rates at which
the remaining, feasible taxes should be set. Thus, a critical difference
between Ramsey's earlier analysis and more recent analyses, such as that of
Diamond and Nirrlees, is that Ramsey assumed that there were no profits taxes,
Diamond and Mirrlees assumed that there were no profits (or equivalently,
profits were taxed at 100%). Neither is a good assumption for most countries.
And both analyses assumed the absence of an income tax.
Though traditional arguments against commodity and interest income
taxation, based on counting the number of distortions, are not persuasive, the
theory of self-selection shows that the nature of commodity taxation should
depend simply on how the marginal rate of substitution between two commodities
is affected by the amount of leisure; in the central case of separability, no
commodity taxes should be imposed.
Although this analysis has shown that the widely held view that in the
second best world nothing can be said is incorrect- -we have obtained some quite
general qualitative propositions --wehave also shown that those qualitative
results are, in turn, quite dependent on the precise assumptions concerning the
set of admissable taxes. The theory itself has, however, had little to say
about the determinants of the set of admissable taxes.
Though optimal consumption tax structures are, in general, non-linear, the
presence of non-linearities increases the administrative problems associated
58with the tax system. Whether the gains are worth the cost remains unproven.
The suggestion contained in some of the numerical calculations that the overall
welfare gains from optimal taxation (using a utilitarian welfare criterion) are
small and that the optimal tax structure may be close to linear indicates that
it may not be unreasonable to focus attention on linear tax structures.
Moreover Pareto efficient non-linear structures have some properties that may
make them politically unacceptable: the marginal tax rate on the highest
income individuals is negative, except in the limiting case where the
elasticity of substitution between laborers of different skills is infinite, in
which case, the marginal tax rate on the highest income individual should be
-zero.
The focus on the incentive effects of taxation has, however, provided key
insights: it has enabled us to identify the parameters which determine the
magnitude of the deadweight losses associated with any tax system. The trade-
offs on which this literature has focused in the design of the tax structure
are at the core of many of the recent policy debates. Negative income tax
proposals typically increase marginal tax rates for some individuals while
reducing it for others, and an assessment of these proposals requires a
balancing of the efficiency and equity effects on these different groups.
On the other hand, many of the central policy issues transcend these
models, and the disparity between these may provide suggestions for future
directions for research. We have already referred to one set of such issues:
those related to administrative problems. The information problems associated
with monitoring and assessing income to capital may be no less important than
those with which we have been concerned here. The view that by encouraging
savings and investment, growth will be enhanced and thus all individuals;
59including the poor, will be better off is partly reflected in our analysis of
the general equilibrium effects of taxation, but only partly so. In particu-
lar, we have paid little attention to R and D, to entrepreneurship and risk
taking, or to the consequences of imperfect capital markets.
Though the work discussed here suggests that there are distinct
advantages to imposing differential tax rates on different groups, whose labor
supply characteristics differ (and that ex ante expected welfare may even be
increased by imposing differential tax rates on groups whose characteristics do
not differ), popular views of fairness seem inconsistent with these results
produced by the utilitarian calculus.55
Though utilitarianism has often been thought to provide a basis of
choosing among alternative Pareto efficient tax structures, to do so requires
choosing a particular cardinalization, and no persuasive basis for choosing
among alternative cardinalizations has been provided.56 Moreover, most
analyses, while assuming that individuals differ in their productivity in the
55We have, moreover, consistently ignored any political
economy considerations. These might suggest that constitutional
restrictions on the set of admissable taxes may be welfare
enhancing, for instance when the rates and terms at which those
taxes are imposed are determined by majority voting.
56 We have also not entered into the debate concerning the
appropriateness of the utilitarian approach on more fundamental philosophical
grounds. We have noted Rawls' views suggesting that utilitarianism is
insufficiently equalitarian. Brian Berry, while disagreeing with much of
Rawis' work, remarks, ". . .Rawls, in taking utiltarianism as the main rival to
his own account, is flogging an almost dead stalking-horse." (The Liberal
Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1973)
One can perhaps best view the utilitarian calculus as simply providing a
convenient way of summarizing the effects of a policy change. (See Stiglitz
(l986a).
Notice that our results on Pareto efficient tax structures are not liable
to most of the criticisms leveled against the utilitarian approach.
60market place, ignore differences in home-productivity. When these are taken
into account, the case for redistributive taxation becomes even weaker.
Thus, while the original goal of this line of research, which was to
provide a "scientific" basis for arguing for a progressive tax structure and
for analyzing the design of tax systems, has not been achieved--and does not
seem achievable- -importantinsights have been gleaned, which should enable
governments to make better choices of tax policies in the future.
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